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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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             Justin J. Clark, 
                          Appellant  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2:05-cr-00099-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Alan N. Bloch 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 16, 2013 
 
Before:  SMITH, FISHER, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Justin Clark violated the conditions of his supervised 
release.  At his revocation hearing, the District Court revoked 
Clark’s release and imposed a new term of imprisonment 
followed by another term of supervised release.  On appeal, 
Clark challenges only the new term of supervised release, 
arguing that its imposition was procedurally unreasonable and 
that the procedural defects rendered the sentence 
substantively unreasonable as well.   
 
The statute that governs imposition and revocation of 
supervised release directs the sentencing court to consider 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 
3583(c), 3583(e).   Clark’s appeal presents a question of first 
impression for this Court:  whether a district court must 
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conduct one § 3553(a) analysis for post-revocation 
incarceration and another § 3553(a) analysis for a new term 
of supervised release.  We hold that it need not.  A district 
court may provide a single analysis that reflects meaningful 
consideration of the relevant § 3553(a) factors to support each 
portion of a revocation sentence.   
 
Though we reject Clark’s contention that a district 
court imposing a post-revocation term of supervised release 
must conduct a second § 3553(a) analysis, we nonetheless 
hold that the sentence imposed was procedurally 
unreasonable.  The record before us does not reflect 
meaningful consideration of the relevant § 3553(a) factors.  
We  will therefore vacate and remand the District Court’s 
judgment of sentence. 
 
I. 
 
 Clark pled guilty to one count of possession with intent 
to distribute a substance containing cocaine base in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).  In 2006, he 
was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment followed by 
five years of supervised release.  Clark later moved for a 
reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582.  The 
District Court granted the motion and reduced Clark’s 
sentence to 100 months of imprisonment.  The Government 
later moved for another reduction pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 35(b).  The District Court granted that 
motion as well and reduced Clark’s sentence to time served.  
Clark began his five-year term of supervised release in 
November 2009.    
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 During his term of supervised release, Clark agreed to 
two modifications to the conditions of his release — to 
participate in mental health and anger management 
counseling and to be subject to electronic monitoring.  On 
July 24, 2012, Clark’s probation officer filed a Petition on 
Supervised Release, alleging that Clark had left the judicial 
district without the permission of the court or his probation 
officer in violation of the conditions of his release.  The 
petition reported that Clark was a passenger in a vehicle that 
had been pulled over in Iowa and that Clark “was found to be 
in possession of $20,000 cash.”  Appendix (“App.”) 32.   
 
 Clark admitted to the violation.  At his revocation 
hearing, where he faced an advisory United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range of 7 to 13 months of 
imprisonment, Clark requested house arrest instead of a new 
term of incarceration and emphasized that he had not been 
arrested or charged with any crime in connection with the 
incident in Iowa.  The Government sought revocation and 
asked the District Court to impose 13 months of 
incarceration, the top of the advisory Guidelines range.  The 
Government also represented that two separate amounts of 
money were found in the car — $10,000 and $20,000. 
 
 The District Court observed that the amount of money 
recovered from the car in Iowa was “questionable,” even 
though Clark was not charged with any crime, and detailed 
other misconduct that occurred during Clark’s supervised 
release including three traffic citations, failure to make 
payments on fines arising from those citations, failure to 
make payments on a bank loan, and a drug test that indicated 
the presence of marijuana.  App. 52-53.  The court concluded 
that Clark’s “overall conduct has demonstrated a general 
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pattern of noncompliance with supervision and has indicated 
that a term of imprisonment is necessary pursuant to Title 18 
of the United States Code, Section 3553(a).”  App. 53.  The 
court then revoked Clark’s supervised release and sentenced 
him to 13 months of imprisonment followed by a 47-month 
term of supervised release.  The hearing concluded with 
additional discussion of the relevant § 3553(a) factors: 
 
After considering the sentences 
available, the advisory guideline 
range, and the factors set forth in . 
. . Section 3553, the Court finds 
that this sentence is consistent 
with the nature, circumstances, 
and seriousness of the defendant’s 
violations and his history, 
characteristics, educational, 
vocational and corrective needs, 
as well as the need for just, non-
disparate punishment, deterrence, 
and protection of the public. . . .  
We adjourn.  
 
 App. 55.  Defense counsel immediately objected to the 
imposition of 47 months of supervised release as unsupported 
by the record and unreasonable based on the facts of the case.  
The District Court did not address the objection on the record.  
 
 Clark filed this timely appeal, arguing that the 
imposition of 47 months of supervised release for his 
revocation violation was procedurally and substantively 
unreasonable.   
 
6 
 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise jurisdiction over Clark’s appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).    
 
Clark challenges the imposition of a 47-month term of 
supervised release for the revocation violation and contends 
that the District Court committed procedural and substantive 
error by failing to apply separately the § 3553(a) factors when 
imposing the new term of supervised release.  We review the 
procedural and substantive reasonableness of a revocation 
sentence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Doe, 617 
F.3d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 2010).   When considering a 
procedural challenge to a revocation sentencing hearing, we 
ask whether the district court has given “rational and 
meaningful consideration to the relevant § 3553(a)  factors.”  
Id. (quotation marks omitted).  If we conclude that the 
sentence was procedurally sound, our inquiry shifts to 
substantive reasonableness.  To address a defendant’s 
contention that the sentence imposed was substantively 
unreasonable, we ask “whether the final sentence, wherever it 
may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised 
upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant 
factors.”  Id. at 770 (quotation marks omitted).  A defendant 
who alleges substantive unreasonableness carries a heavy 
burden; “we will affirm the sentencing court ‘unless no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 
sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the 
district court provided.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)).   
 
III. 
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A. 
Clark asserts that procedural error arose from the 
District Court’s failure to adhere to the familiar three-step 
sentencing process.  A sentencing court must (1) calculate the 
advisory Guidelines range, (2) formally rule on any departure 
motions and state how those rulings affect the advisory range, 
and (3) exercise its discretion pursuant to the factors set forth 
in § 3553(a).  United States v. Lofink, 564 F.3d 232, 237-38 
(3d Cir. 2009).  In a revocation hearing, however, the court 
must also adhere to the statutory requirements set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3583.  See Doe, 617 F.3d at 771-72; United States v. 
Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543-44 (3d Cir. 2007).    
 
Section 3583 controls post-conviction and post-
revocation supervised release.   When imposing a defendant’s 
initial term of imprisonment, a district court may, after 
considering certain factors set forth in § 3553(a), include a 
term of supervised release.  18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(a), 3583(c).  A 
defendant serving a term of supervised release must adhere to 
certain conditions, both mandatory and discretionary.  See id. 
§ 3583(d).   If the defendant violates those conditions, the 
court may, after considering the same § 3553(a) factors 
relevant to the initial term of supervised release, revoke or 
modify the defendant’s supervised release.  18 U.S.C. § 
3583(e).   Even though § 3583(e) omits some of the § 3553(a) 
factors, such as 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (directing the court 
to consider the seriousness of the offense), consideration of 
those omitted factors is not prohibited.  United States v. 
Young, 634 F.3d 233, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 
If the court revokes supervised release and sentences 
the defendant to a new term of imprisonment, it may include 
a new term of supervised release as well.  18 U.S.C. § 
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3583(h) (“subsection (h)”).  Though subsection (h) does not 
specify a procedure for reimposition of supervised release, we 
hold that sentencing courts are to consider those § 3553(a) 
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c), the provision governing 
imposition of the initial term of supervised release.  See 
United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 594 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 
2010) (“As subsection (h) does not list the factors to be 
considered in imposing a term of supervised release as part of 
a revocation sentence, it is a reasonable inference that the 
factors are the same as those to be considered in imposing an 
initial term of supervised release.”).     
 
We turn now to the issue of whether the District Court 
was obligated to conduct two § 3553(a) analyses:  one with 
respect to Clark’s 13-month term of imprisonment and one 
with respect to Clark’s 47-month term of supervised release.  
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has considered 
this question and held that a district court did not err when it 
conducted a single § 3553(a) analysis for both portions of a 
defendant’s post-revocation sentence.  United States v. Penn, 
601 F.3d 1007, 1011-12 (10th Cir. 2010).  In Penn, the 
sentencing judge had discussed several of the § 3553(a) 
factors and “stated his reasons for imposing both 
reimprisonment and supervised release.”  Id. at 1012.  The 
defendant challenged the imposition of supervised release as 
part of the revocation sentence, arguing that the district court 
erroneously failed to discuss the § 3553(a) factors as they 
related to the new term of supervised release.  Id. at 1011.  
The court rejected the challenge and declined to require a 
separate § 3553(a) discussion when imposing supervised 
release.  “Because we do not require ritualistic incantations of 
these factors,” the court reasoned, “and because the district 
court explained his consideration of the defendant’s 
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characteristics, protecting the public, and the appropriate 
statutes and guidelines, we conclude the district court 
adequately considered the relevant factors and therefore 
committed no error, and certainly no plain error.”  Id. at 1012.    
 
Though this Court has not previously ruled on the 
question raised by Clark’s appeal, our jurisprudence 
regarding the required procedure for post-conviction 
sentencing is instructive.  District courts must exercise their 
discretion to vary above or below the advisory Guidelines 
range by considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors.  Lofink, 
564 F.3d at 238.   But we have never required that a district 
court conduct two § 3553(a) analyses, one related to the term 
of imprisonment and a second related to the term of 
supervised release.  See United States v. Joline, 662 F.3d 657, 
660 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that, when imposing a 
sentence that includes supervised release, a sentencing court 
must simply “furnish an explanation of the sentence . . . 
sufficient for the reviewing court to see that the particular 
circumstances of the case have been given meaningful 
consideration within the parameters of § 3553(a)” (quotation 
marks omitted)); see also United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 
558, 572 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that “a district court’s 
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors sufficient to justify a 
term of incarceration as procedurally reasonable can also 
demonstrate that the imposition of special conditions [of 
supervised release] is procedurally reasonable”); United 
States v. O’Georgia, 569 F.3d 281, 289 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(observing that “repetition” of the court’s § 3553(a) analysis 
“would serve no useful purpose in the ordinary case”).    
 
More broadly, we value formality in sentencing to the 
extent that it promotes the goals of procedural uniformity, 
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meaningful review, and substantive fairness.  See United 
States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 318 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining 
that both the form and the substance of sentencing are “of 
high importance . . . to ensure that a substantively reasonable 
sentence has been imposed in a procedurally fair way” 
(quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Ausburn, 502 
F.3d 313, 328-29 (3d Cir. 2007) (requiring a record sufficient 
for review, not a “rote statement of the § 3553(a) factors” 
(quotation marks omitted)).  We ultimately review a sentence 
for reasonableness and ask “whether the record as a whole 
reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors 
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United States v. Grier, 
475 F.3d 556,  571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  For instance, a 
district court need not “discuss and make findings as to each 
of the § 3553(a) factors” so long as the record makes clear 
that the court has taken them into account.  United States v. 
Kulick, 629 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks 
omitted); see also Lofink, 564 F.3d at 238 n.13; Tomko, 562 
F.3d at 568.  The relevant inquiry is whether the District 
Court gave “meaningful consideration to the relevant § 
3553(a) factors,” United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 216 
(3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted), such that, on 
review, we may understand the “rationale by which [the] 
district court reache[d] a final sentence,” Grier, 475 F.3d at 
572.     
 
Clark invites this Court to require additional procedure 
when a post-revocation sentence includes a new term of 
supervised release.  Because these added layers of formality 
would not necessarily further any substantive end, we decline 
to add additional procedural requirements.  We therefore hold 
that, when imposing a post-revocation sentence, a district 
court must conduct a § 3553(a) analysis that gives meaningful 
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consideration to the relevant factors, including those factors 
made relevant to post-revocation sentencing by 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(e) and (h).  While a sentencing court may wish to divide 
its analysis by discussing the § 3553(a) factors in the context 
of incarceration and again in the context of supervised 
release, such separation is not required.  In many cases, such 
a division would be unnecessarily redundant.  A full 
discussion of relevant factors, which include the nature of the 
offense, the defendant’s history, the need for deterrence, and 
the need to protect the public, will likely include analysis that 
supports the punitive purposes of post-revocation 
incarceration, see Bungar, 478 F.3d at 544 (explaining that 
post-revocation imprisonment is imposed “primarily to 
sanction the defendant’s breach of trust”), as well as the 
rehabilitative purposes of supervised release, see United 
States v. Murray, 692 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(explaining that “the primary purpose of supervised release is 
to facilitate the reentry of offenders into their communities, 
rather than to inflict punishment”).     
 
B. 
 
 We now evaluate the procedure followed at Clark’s 
revocation hearing in light of the foregoing standards.  In 
particular, we ask whether the District Court’s § 3553(a) 
discussion indicated meaningful consideration of those 
factors that would support post-revocation incarceration and 
supervised release.   
 
 The District Court focused its § 3553(a) discussion on 
§ 3553(a)(1), which directs the court to consider “the nature 
and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant.”  The court first addressed 
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the nature of Clark’s offense that led to revocation and 
considered Clark’s history — his “general pattern of 
noncompliance with supervision.”  App. 53.  After a full 
discussion of the first relevant factor, however, the court 
merely enumerated the remaining § 3553(a) factors relevant 
to a revocation sentence, stating that the sentence imposed “is 
consistent with . . . the defendant’s . . . educational, 
vocational and corrective needs as well as the need for just, 
non-disparate punishment, deterrence, and protection of the 
public.”  App. 55.  This rote recitation of the relevant factors, 
see Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 328-29, cannot support a conclusion 
that “the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful 
consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a),” Grier, 475 F.3d at 571 (quotation marks omitted).  
Nor can we determine, from the record before us, that the 
court “reasonably applied those factors to the circumstance of 
the case.”  Bungar, 478 F.3d at 540.    
  
 When the record does not evidence “rational and 
meaningful consideration [of] the relevant § 3553(a) factors,” 
Doe, 617 F.3d at 769 (quotation marks omitted), we are 
bound to conclude that the sentence imposed was 
procedurally unreasonable, and we do so here.  Because we 
will vacate and remand on this basis, we need not address 
Clark’s contention that his sentence was substantively 
unreasonable as well.   
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s judgment of sentence and will remand for 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.   
 
